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ARTICLES
THE COVID-19 VACCINE DILEMMA
DORIT RUBINSTEIN REISS*
COVID-19 continues to lead to large numbers of deaths, harms, and financial costs.
Without an effective vaccine, those will continue. The pressure to find a vaccine is high;
and that pressure places a risk on the safeguards in place to assure that vaccines are safe
and effective will be ignored. The United States has an extensive apparatus to oversee
vaccine safety before and after licensing, including multiple federal committees and several
monitoring systems, and that apparatus gave us, in 2020, an extraordinarily safe vaccine
supply. This Article explains the different pressures that push for and against using the
same apparatus for COVID-19 vaccines, including the extensive harms from the disease on
one side and the need for a vaccine that is, in fact, safe and effective on the other. It examines
the options for speeding up the process without sacrificing too much oversight. It examines
which “shortcuts” are reasonable, which may be challenging, and which are bad ideas.
Finally, it addresses three messaging challenges—overselling, under-sharing, and
responding to misinformation—and suggests how to handle them.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 4, 2020, Science Magazine published an article stating that
“Operation Warp Speed,” a public–private partnership started by the federal
government with the purpose of developing an effective vaccine, “selected five
experimental COVID-19 vaccines to fast–track through testing and,
potentially, mass–scale production.”1 Such news surprised top scientists
involved with the White House-led program.2 The article went on to explain
that Operation Warp Speed will give chosen companies “access to additional
government money, help in running clinical trials and financial and logistical
support for a manufacturing base that is being built even before it is clear which
if any of the vaccines in development will work.”3 It is possible—and
important—to speed up testing and production of COVID-19 vaccines
without undermining trust in them. But it has to be done right, in a way that
does not cast doubt on the process. The aforementioned article captured fears
of many observers concerned about politically motivated corner cutting in
developing COVID-19 vaccines. While there are several good reasons to want
a vaccine as soon as possible, there are real concerns about rushing a vaccine
to market in the wrong way. The “wrong way” could include forgoing input
from experts or oversight bodies, lacking a basis on scientifically sound criteria,
politicizing certain choices, or lacking transparency in the process.4
Undermining trust could also increase hesitancy towards using the vaccine
even by people who are usually pro-vaccine. The events described in the
article were examples of speeding up vaccine development done wrong. It
does not have to be this way.
In less than six months, COVID-19 dramatically changed our world, both
globally and in the United States. COVID-19 has killed over two hundred
and fifty thousand Americans, hospitalized many more, shut down the
economy, and led most states to issue stay-at-home orders for a period of

1. Jon Cohen, Top U.S. Scientists Left Out of White House Selection of COVID-19 Vaccine Short List,
SCI. MAG. (June 4, 2020, 7:45 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/06/top-usscientists-left-out-white-house-selection-covid-19-vaccine-shortlist/
(giving
the
name
“Operation Warp Speed” to a government project aimed to speeding up vaccine development);
see also Fact Sheet: Explaining Operation Warp Speed, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://
www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/06/16/fact-sheet-explaining-operation-warp-speed.html
(Nov. 30, 2020) (noting the agencies and firms working on the operation).
2. Cohen, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Paul A. Offit, Could Trump Turn a Vaccine Into a Campaign Stunt?,
N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2020), https://nyti.ms/3h1k5CO (concerning politicizing the process of
releasing a coronavirus vaccine).
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time.5 Citizens, experts, and policymakers continue to struggle to deal with
this disease. The long-term solution for all of the challenges that accompany
COVID-19 is a vaccine that allows individuals to develop immunity to the
virus without being infected.6 Generally, the vaccine development process
takes many years, but waiting years or decades will cause many more deaths
and extensive harms.7 The pressure to get a vaccine to market quickly is
immense, as the costs of allowing COVID-19 to go unchecked are very
high— but speeding up the process comes with real risks.8 The United States
has a very robust system for testing vaccines and monitoring their safety.9 The
current system has resulted in an extraordinarily safe vaccine supply thus far.10
This Article examines not only what can or should be done to speed up
COVID-19 vaccine development but also what should not be done.11
5. Maps & Trends: Mortality Analyses, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. & MED.,
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality (last visited Dec. 2, 2020); Robert O. Bonow et al.,
Association of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) With Myocardial Injury and Mortality, 5 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N CARDIOLOGY 751, 751 (2020); Martin S. Andersen, Early Evidence on Social Distancing
in Response to Covid-19 in the United States 2 (June 25, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3635547_code1834306.pdf?abstractid
=3569368&mirid=1.
6. Stewart Lyman, If Pharma Helps Quench the Covid-19 Pandemic, What Will it Want in
Return?, STAT NEWS (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/21/vaccinequenches-covid-19-what-will-pharma-want-in-return/; Lois Privor-Dumm et al., The Success
of a Covid-19 Vaccine Will Hinge on its Delivery, STAT NEWS (Apr. 25, 2020), https://www.statne
ws.com/2020/04/25/success-covid-19-vaccine-hinge-on-delivery/.
7. The usual process takes over a decade. Cecile Artaud et al., Vaccine Development: From
Preclinical Studies to Phase 1/2 Clinical Trials, in M ALARIA CONTROL & ELIMINATION 165,
165–66 (Frédéric Ariey et al. eds., 2019).
8. Julie Steenhuysen, As Pressure for Coronavirus Vaccine Mounts, Scientists Debate Risks of
Accelerated Testing, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2020, 7:07 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ushealth-coronavirus-vaccines-insight/as-pressure-for-coronavirus-vaccine-mounts-scientistsdebate-risks-of-accelerated-testing-idUSKBN20Y1GZ.
9. U.S. Vaccine Safety – Overview, History, and How it Works, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREV., https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/ensuringsafety/history/index.html
(Sept. 9, 2020).
10.
Ensuring Vaccine Safety, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREV.,
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/ensuringsafety/index.html (July 1, 2020) (“The United
States has the safest, most effective vaccine supply in its history. The . . . vaccine safety system
ensures that vaccines are as safe as possible.”).
11. For some discussions on the topic, see Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Fair Allocation of Scarce
Medical Resources in the Time of Covid-19, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2049, 2049–50 (2020); Thomas J.
Bollyky et al., The Equitable Distribution of Covid-19 Therapeutics and Vaccines, 323 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
2462 (2020). Another important question is how vaccines will be distributed once licensed since
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Pressures may lead to errors and failures in three spheres: oversight failures,
ethical failures, and messaging failures. With COVID-19, pressures derive
both from the harms of the virus itself and from the presidential election since
political factors impose pressures of their own.12 These combined pressures
could enable unjustified corner cutting in the testing process for the vaccine
and allow oversight bodies to ignore problems even after the vaccine is
licensed. At the same time, in the pandemic context, nonaction also carries
real costs, and in such times, there is no cost-free or risk-free choice.
Policymakers need to consider both sides of this dilemma when making
choices. Other concerns include messaging failures, such as overly optimistic
messaging that creates unrealistic expectations, as well as messaging that
creates concerns throughout the public that the vaccine produced will be
unsafe—even when that is not the reality.
While the reactions to COVID-19 are specific to this pandemic, this
general scenario—a tension between a dangerous, harmful disease and the
potential risks of not going through the full process of overseeing and vetting
a vaccine—is not new and will likely recur.13 The general tensions described
in this piece, and the considerations around choosing between options, will
be relevant in future crises.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the regulatory
framework governing vaccine licensing and monitoring in routine times.
Part II explains the dilemma COVID-19 poses for vaccine development.
Part III sets out possible scenarios addressing regulatory concerns and ethical
concerns. Part IV addresses potential messaging pitfalls and their harms. I
then conclude that while we should make adjustment to allow for fast
development where we can, we need to make sure we are not sacrificing
safety or effectiveness in the process.
I.

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Vaccines are classified as biologics under the Public Health Service Act of
1944.14 In practice, this means that vaccines are subject to both the
at least, at first, there will likely be limited quantities available. That topic is beyond this article;
it deserves its own treatment.
12. Aimee Picchi, Could Trump Push a Vaccine Through Before Election Day? CBS NEWS (Sept.
11, 2020, 3:04 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/coronavirus-vaccine-process-fda-politica
l-pressure/.
13. Brit Trogen et al., Adverse Consequences of Rushing a SARS-CoV-2 Vaccine Implications for
Public Trust, 323 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2460 (2020).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i). Biologics are defined as a “virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin,
vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product or analogous product or
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requirements of the Public Health Service Act and of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), which applies to licensing drugs under the Food,
Drug and Cosmetics Act.15 Marketing a biologic requires the sponsor,
usually a pharmaceutical company, to submit a Biologics License
Application,16 which requires showing that the biologic is “safe, pure, potent
and effective.”17 The FDA interprets the Public Health Safety Act to require
that biologics—like other drugs—undergo “controlled clinical
investigations” in humans.18 To get to human clinical trials, the sponsor must
submit an Investigational New Drug (IND) application to the FDA.19 An
IND application requires that “preclinical studies should be sufficient to rule
out overt toxicity and identify potential toxic effects that might occur during
the clinical trial.” 20 The FDA “has 30 days” to object after the agency
receives an IND submission or the clinical “trial may proceed.”21 The IND
application usually requires evidence of safety and immunogenicity (ability
to elicit an immune response—that the vaccine candidate works) in animals,
as well as other data.22 The vaccine then undergoes three stages of clinical
trials, described by the FDA:23
Pre-marketing (pre-licensure) vaccine clinical trials are typically done in three phases,
as is the case for any drug or biologic. Initial human studies, referred to as Phase 1,
are safety and immunogenicity studies performed in a small number of closely
monitored subjects. Phase 2 studies are dose-ranging studies and may enroll hundreds
of subjects. Finally, Phase 3 trials typically enroll thousands of individuals and provide

arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine . . . applicable to the prevention, treatment, or
cure of a disease or condition of human beings.” Kathleen R. Kelleher, Note, FDA Approval of
Generic Biologics: Finding a Regulatory Pathway, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 245, 247 (2007).
15. Edward L. Korwek, Human Biological Drug Regulation: Past, Present, and Beyond the Year
2000, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 129 (1995); Kelleher, supra note 14 at 248.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(1)(A).
17. Tam Q. Dinh, Potential Pathways for Abbreviated Approval of Generic Biologics under Existing
Law and Proposed Reforms to the Law, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 77, 84 (2007).
18. Id.; see also U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE JOURNEY OF
YOUR CHILD’S VACCINE (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/parents/infographics/journ
ey-of-child-vaccine-h.pdf (describing the three phases of clinical trials researchers use to test
new vaccines).
19. 21 C.F.R. § 312.20(a).
20. Valerie Marshall & Norman W. Baylor, Food and Drug Administration Regulation and
Evaluation of Vaccines, 127 PEDIATRICS S23, S26 (Supp. 2011).
21. Id. at S27.
22. Vaccine Development - 101, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/vaccine
s-blood-biologics/development-approval-process-cber/vaccine-product-approval-process
(Nov. 20, 2020).
23. Id.
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the critical documentation of effectiveness and important additional safety data
required for licensing. 24

The completed trials are then submitted to the FDA’s Center for Biologics
Evaluation and Research (CBER), where a “multidisciplinary FDA reviewer
team (medical officers, microbiologists, chemists, biostatisticians, etc.)”
reviews the evidence.25 If the team gives the go ahead, the material is
submitted to the FDA’s Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory
Committee (VRBPAC), which advises the FDA about the vaccine’s “safety
and effectiveness.”26 Since one of the aspects that separates biologic licensing
from drug licensing is that for biologics the manufacturing plant is also
licensed, during the review period the manufacturing plant and process of
producing the vaccine is also subject to inspection and review.27 Normally,
this takes time.28
Table 1: Vaccine Development Timeline, an Estimate29
Time Period

Stage

Description

“Month 0-24” (This
can also take many
years).

“Preclinical”

During this period, scientists study the
pathogen to decide what type of vaccine
to do. They may choose to focus on the

24. Id.
25. Id.; see also Marshall & Baylor, supra note 20, at S23, S27.
26. Vaccine Development - 101, supra note 22; see also Marshall & Baylor, supra note 20 at, S28.
27. Marshall & Baylor, supra note 20 at, S27.
28. Ana Santos Rutschman, The Vaccine Race in the 21st Century, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 729, 731
(2019) (noting that the time that inspection and review takes is not only an issue during a
pandemic; generally, this means that vaccines are not ready when the threat of a new
pathogen is highest).
29. This table heavily draws on a blog post created by an anonymous blogger with
pharmaceutical experience and, with the permission of the author, with some information I
added. I have made changes to the language for clarity, but by and large, this is drawn from:
Coronavirus Vaccine Development – It’s Going to Take a Long Time, SKEPTICAL RAPTOR: BLOG (Apr. 19,
2020), [hereinafter Vaccine Development Timeline] https://www.skepticalraptor.com/skepticalrapto
rblog.php/coronavirus-vaccine-development-its-going-to-take-a-long-time/. Note that this
description assumes the virus or bacterial causing the disease has been identified—a necessary
first step, which in many cases takes additional time - and that the timeline is likely “optimistic.”
Id. For example, the rotavirus vaccine took twenty-six years to develop. Sabin Institute Honors Paul
Offit, MD, Vaccine Champion, CHILD. HOSP. OF PHILA. RSCH. INST.: CORNERSTONE BLOG (May
2, 2018), https://www.research.chop.edu/cornerstone-blog/sabin-institute-honors-paul-offitmd-vaccine-champion; Greg Johnson, Q&A with Paul Offit, PENN TODAY (May 14, 2015),
https://penntoday.upenn.edu/2015-05-14/interviews/qa-paul-offit.
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part of the virus or bacteria, or on the
entire organism. Scientists are looking
for the best way to trigger an immune
response without causing the disease or
causing harm to humans. They then
need to develop an animal model in
which they can test the vaccine
candidate to see if produces immunity in
a safe manner. The hope is that the
model will be sufficiently relevant to
allow scientists to draw conclusions for
the effects in humans; though, those
conclusions will be tentative until human
testing is done.
“Month 24”

“IND
application”

Once the preclinical studies are
completed,
the
“sponsoring
organization” (which is usually an
experienced vaccine manufacturer)
submits an IND application to FDA. The
application is reviewed by the Center for
Biologics Evaluation and Research
(CBER) in FDA. If it is approved, the
company can prepare for—and then
begin—clinical trials in humans.

“Month 24-60 (or
more)”

“[C]linical
trials”

The vaccine manufacturing company
applies to an Institutional Review Board
(IRB) for permission to test the drug in
human. Then, the product undergoes
three stages of clinical trials:
“Phase 1 clinical trials usually include
around 100 healthy patients ( . . . no
comorbidities and generally lack any
chronic health conditions). This study is
not usually randomized or blinded, as
there is only one group, those that receive
the vaccine.” Phase 1 clinical trials are
intended to alert you to safety problems
or signals, and help determine vaccine
dose. Many studies terminate after Phase

ACCORD 6.1_REISS_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

56

12/6/2020 4:33 PM

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW ACCORD

[6:1

I because of safety concerns. But at this
point, you do not have good information
about safety or effectiveness.
“Phase 2 clinical trials usually include
around 200-300 patients. This study is a
randomized, double-blind trial . . . .” It
provides initial indications of effectiveness
and safety, which help researchers
determine if there is justification to move
to the next phase.
“Phase 3 clinical trials, sometimes called
pivotal studies, include around 2–3
thousand patients” though for vaccines
there could be tens of thousands of
subjects.
“These studies must be
randomized, double-blinded, [and]
placebo-controlled ( . . . [or using] a
standard of care control).”
The results of “[P]hase 2 and 3 clinical
trials”, when showing success, “are often
published in peer-reviewed journals.”
“Month 60-78”

“[R]egulatory
review
and
approval”

Once the testing of the vaccine candidate
is complete, the company manufacturing
it can—if the results justify it—submit a
Biologics License Application (BLA) to
CBER. It will simultaneously develop a
manufacturing plan and prepare to build
manufacturing facilities with enough
capacity to produce the needed amount
of vaccine. These facilities, in turn, need
also be approved by the FDA.

Vaccine development takes time for a number of reasons. It can take time
to set up clinical trials and get volunteers.30 For example, although Moderna

30. Vaccine Development Timeline, supra note 29.
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opened its clinical trial in late July, by September 11, 2020, they only had
23,497 participants out of the intended 30,000.31 Other obstacles include
reaching the broad diversity needed for a clinical trial.32 Then, data needs
to be collected by closely monitoring participants over a long enough period,
and analyzed in multiple ways, to ensure accuracy.33 Normally, exposing
participants to the virus intentionally is unethical, so researchers need to wait
long enough for natural exposure to happen in a large enough segment of
participants.34 As discussed below, one of the approaches considered to
expedite COVID-19 vaccines is to intentionally expose volunteers to the
virus.35 Further, to see whether immunity is more than transient, the trial
will have to proceed for multiple months.36 To give some examples,
Gardasil—a vaccine against the Human Papilloma Virus—involved Phase
III trials that followed participants for about three years.37 For rotavirus,
infants were followed for a year.38 There are problems that may arise and
consequently slow down the process. Sometimes vaccines need to be
reworked. When a vaccine does not produce intended results, scientists need
to go back to the beginning and find a solution, if possible. It is also important
to remember that there is no guarantee any vaccine candidate will pass
clinical trials; in fact, clinical trials fail over 80% of the time.39 In the case of
COVID-19 vaccines, there are over one hundred in development and tens

31. Brian Orelli, Moderna Slowed Enrollment in Its Phase 3 Coronavirus Vaccine Clinical Trial,
MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 13, 2020, 12:13 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2020/09/13/mo
derna-slowed-enrollment-in-its-phase-3-coronavir/.
32. Jenae Barnes, A Black Participant in Moderna’s Covid-19 Vaccination Trial: Trust the Vaccine,
ABC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2020, 3:05 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/black-participantmodernas-covid-19-vaccination-trial-trust/story?id=72654085.
33. Vaccine Development Timeline, supra note 29.
34. Id.
35. See infra Part III, at 56–57.
36. Smriti Mallapaty and Heidi Ledford, COVID-vaccine Results are on the Way – and Scientists’
Concerns are Growing, NATURE (Sept. 25, 2020) https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-02002706-6.
37. See generally Suzanne M. Garland et al., Quadrivalent Vaccine Against Human Papillomavirus
to Prevent Anogenital Diseases, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1928 (2007); The FUTURE II Study
Group, Quadrivalent Vaccine Against Human Papillomavirus to Prevent Anogenital Diseases, 356 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1915, 1915–16, 1924 (2007).
38. Timo Vesikari et al., Safety and Efficacy of a Pentavalent Human–Bovine (WC3) Reassortant
Rotavirus Vaccine, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 23, 26 (2006).
39. See JA DiMasi et al., Trends in Risks Associated with New Drug Development: Success Rates
for Investigational Drugs, 87 CLINICAL PHARMA. & THERAPEUTICS 272, 272–74, 276–77
(2010), (observing that the success rate in clinical trials in the United States was 16%
between 1999–2004).
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that have started clinical trials in humans.40 The data suggests that we will
have more than one successful vaccine candidate, at some point.
Licensing is not the end of the process or scrutiny. First, production is
subject to continuing scrutiny—the FDA exercises some oversight over
“lot[s]”, or batches, of vaccines.41 Historical experience supports this
requirement: one of the worst vaccine disasters in the United States was the
result of a mishandled manufacturing process. 42 In the Cutter incident,
nearly 200 children were paralyzed and ten died because a polio vaccine
that should have contained an inactivated virus included a live, virulent
virus instead.43 Close oversight of the manufacturing process helps prevent
similar tragedies. Another concern is the potential contamination of
vaccines, as there are several instances of contamination in the past. 44 Each
lot of the licensed vaccine is subject to testing. 45 Licensed vaccine
production facilities need to be “inspected at least every 2 years.” 46 In
addition, multiple oversight mechanisms exist to oversee vaccine safety after
licensing (like VRBPAC does before licensing).47 These mechanisms are not
only used to discover issues that may have been missed during trials but also
to find issues trials are too small to discover.48 While clinical trials include
up to tens of thousands of people, they would not identify a problem that is
as rare as, say, one per a hundred thousand. 49

40. Ewen Callaway, The Race for Coronavirus Vaccines: A Graphical Guide, NATURE (Apr. 28,
2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01221-y; see also Draft Landscape of
COVID-19 Candidate Vaccines, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/publications/m/
item/draft-landscape-of-covid-19-candidate-vaccines Dec 2, 2020).
41. Vaccine Development - 101, supra note 22; Dinh, supra note 17.
42. Paul A. Offit, The Cutter Incident, 50 Years Later, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1411, 1411 (2005).
43. Id.; Trogen et al., supra note 13; Johnson, supra note 29.
44. See generally John Petricciani et al., Adventitious Agents in Viral Vaccines: Lessons Learned from
4 Case Studies, 42 BIOLOGICALS 223 (2014).
45. Marshall & Baylor, supra note 20, at S23, S28–29 (2011); Theresa M. Finn, U.S. FDA
Requirements for Human Vaccine Product Safety and Potency Testing, 5 PROCEDIA VACCINOLOGY 137,
139 (2011).
46. Marshall & Baylor, supra note 20, at S29.
47. Id. at S28–29.
48. Id. at S29.
49. Steven Black, The Importance of Active Surveillance in the Assessment of Vaccine Safety 1
CCDC WKLY. 26, 26 (2019) (“[W]ith rare events, such as Guillain–Barre Syndrome,
detecting a 2-fold increased relative risk with a background incidence of 1/100,000 would
require a study of more than 4.7 million people. This would be impossible in a clinical trial,
but by using large clinical datasets, however, such an association can be assessed.”).
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However, continuous monitoring can uncover these rare problems.50 In
the United States, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
uses a combination of methods to monitor vaccine safety.51 These methods
include oversight by federal expert committees and maintaining
sophisticated databases for researchers to analyze and discover problems.52
First, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), made up
of fifteen experts in “infectious diseases, pediatrics, internal medicine, family
medicine, virology, immunology, public health, preventive medicine, vaccine
research and policy, economics and cost-effectiveness”—as well as a
“consumer representative”—monitors vaccines, usually starting about two
years before licensure.53 ACIP makes recommendations about the vaccine
schedule for both children and adults and reviews vaccine safety data during
its meetings, which take place three times a year, and continuously through
its work groups.54 For COVID-19 vaccines, a work group started in April
2020 made progress on a vaccine.55 Also meeting three times a year is the
National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC), whose duties include to
“[s]tudy and recommend ways to encourage the availability of an adequate
supply of safe and effective vaccination products in the United States,” and
to “[r]ecommend research priorities and other measures the Director of the
National Vaccine Program, an office in HHS should take to enhance the
safety and efficacy of vaccines.”56 NVAC includes fifteen public members,
“selected from individuals who are engaged in vaccine research or the
manufacture of vaccines, or who are physicians, members of parent
organizations concerned with immunizations, representatives of State or
50. See Vaccine Safety Scientific Agenda, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 1, 3−5,
https://www.hhs.gov/vaccines/national-vaccine-plan/vaccine-safety-scientific-agenda/in
dex.html (June 10, 2019) (explaining systems for vaccine safety, including VAERS, VSD,
and PRISM).
51. Id. at 1−4.
52. Id.
53. See Jean Clare Smith, The Structure, Role, and Procedures of the U.S. Advisory Committee on
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 285 VACCINE A68, A68, A71 (2010).
54. Id. at A70–A72. See generally ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON IMMUNIZATION PRACTICES
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 4–5, 7, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2018),
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/committee/downloads/Policies-Procedures-508.pdf.
55. See Beth Bell, Work Group Chair, U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention,
Introduction for Presentation on ACIP COVID-19 Vaccines Work Group 2–3, 8 (June 24,
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/meetings/downloads/slides-2020-06/COVID05-Bell-508.pdf (discussing mission and founding of Work Group, and introducing presenters
on COVID-19 vaccine development, considerations, and next steps).
56. NVAC Charter, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. https://www.hhs.gov/vaccin
es/nvac/charter/index.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
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local health agencies or public health organizations,” and two representatives
of the vaccine industry.57 Finally, among the responsibilities of the Advisory
Committee on Childhood Vaccines (ACCA) are the duties to “advise the
Secretary . . . regarding the need for childhood vaccination products that
result in fewer or no significant adverse reactions.”58 The Committee also
collects data on vaccines’ adverse reactions and suggests research related to
it.59 The ACCA committee’s members are “three . . . health professionals”
with “expertise in the health care of children, the epidemiology, etiology, and
prevention of childhood diseases, and the adverse reactions associated with
vaccines, of whom at least two shall be pediatricians,” “three members from
the general public,” at least two “legal representatives of children who have
suffered a vaccine-related injury or death,” and “three . . . attorneys,” at least
one specializing in representing vaccine injury cases, and one who represents
vaccine manufacturers.60 Since these committees are all subject to the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, meetings and materials are public and
easily accessible, allowing for public scrutiny of proceedings.61
In addition to advisory committees, there are four large computerized
systems that collect data on vaccine risks.62 These include the Vaccine Adverse
Events Reporting System (VAERS), a passive reporting system that anyone
can report to, designed to provide early warnings of issues.63 Although,
VAERS has real limits as a passive monitoring system, it has successfully
caught issues in the past. For example, VAERS has caught a rare (1:10,000),
serious side effect of the first Rotavirus vaccine to be licensed in the United
States, which was confirmed in an independent investigation.64 The other
three monitoring systems are active monitoring systems. The Vaccine Safety
Datalink (VSD) is a collaboration between the Centers for Disease Control and
57. Id.
58. CHARTER: ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CHILDHOOD VACCINES, U.S. DEP’T. OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 1 (2020), https://www.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/hrsa/advisorycommittees/vaccines/accv-charter.pdf.
59. Id.; see also Efthimios Parasidis, Recalibrating Vaccination Laws, 97 B.U. L. REV. 2153,
2227 (2017) (suggesting the Committee should be used more).
60. Advisory Comm’n on Childhood Vaccines Charter, supra note 58.
61. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 2, 10.
62. See generally Vaccine Safety, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS, https://www.vacci
nes.gov/basics/safety (Feb. 2020) (identifying components of vaccine monitoring system).
63. Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/ensuringsafety/monitoring/vaers/ (Sept.
11, 2020).
64. Jason Schwartz, The First Rotavirus Vaccine and the Politics of Acceptable Risk, 90 MILBANK
Q. 278, 285–289 (2012). Although Prof. Schwartz’ account is cautionary, it highlights that the
problems with the vaccine were raised—and followed on—within a few months of its use. Id.
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Prevention (CDC) and healthcare organizations covering millions of people.
It includes both constant active monitoring of signals, by comparing on an
ongoing basis people who have received a vaccine and those who have not.
VSD also allows researchers to do in-depth analyses of specific issues.65 Many
studies are done using VSD data, including a 2018 whitepaper on studying the
safety of the entire schedule.66 The Post-Licensure Rapid Immunization
Safety Monitoring System (PRISM), another large active system, is part of the
FDA Sentinel System—a system designed to monitor medical products by
tracking health insurance claims.67 PRISM covers 171 million people,
allowing for studies larger than other systems.68
Finally, the Clinical Immunization Safety Assessment Project (CISA)
allows providers to submit queries and get an expert evaluation about
specific patients, including evaluations of whether a problem is vaccinerelated or whether an existing condition is a contraindication to a vaccine. 69
CISA also conducts direct research on vaccine safety for specific issues and
special populations.70
Besides these mechanisms in HHS, research is conducted in other parts of
the United States government:
The Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) have
systems to monitor vaccine safety and do vaccine safety research. The National
Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Office of Infectious Disease and HIV/AIDS Policy
(OIDP) also support ongoing research on vaccines and vaccine safety.71

In other words, extensive institutional arrangements for monitoring vaccine
safety exist in the United States in relation to routine vaccines. These
65. Vaccine Safety Datalink (VSD), U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/ensuringsafety/monitoring/vsd/ (Aug. 24, 2020).
66. JASON GLANTZ ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EMERGING & ZOONOTIC INFECTIOUS
DISEASES, WHITE PAPER STUDYING THE SAFETY OF THE CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATION
SCHEDULE FOR THE VACCINE SAFETY DATALINK (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/
pdf/whitepapersafety_web.pdf.
67. See Vaccine Safety, supra note 62; see also Vaccines, Blood, & Biologics Assessments,
SENTINEL, https://www.sentinelinitiative.org/vaccines-blood-biologics/assessments/ (last
visited Dec. 2, 2020).
68. Public Workshop: The Sentinel Post-Licensure Rapid Immunization Safety Monitoring (PRISM)
System, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-blood-biologics/workshops
-meetings-conferences-biologics/public-workshop-sentinel-post-licensure-rapid-immunizationsafety-monitoring-prism-system (Sept. 18. 2018).
69. Clinical Immunization Safety Assessment (CISA) Project, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/ensuringsafety/monitoring/cisa/index.h
tml (July 20, 2020).
70. Id.
71. Vaccine Safety, supra note 62.
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arrangements result in a very high level of safety.72 Summarizing that data,
the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine concluded
that “[v]accines are extremely safe. They have many health benefits and few
side effects.”73
II.

COVID-19 AND THE CHALLENGE TO VACCINES

Normally, vaccine development takes years. But between February 2020
and the end of September 2020, over a million people worldwide died from
COVID-19.74 By December 2, 2020, deaths in the United States topped
269,000.75 By many indications, this is an undercount of deaths.76 Millions
have been infected by the virus.77 Looking at the United States alone, as of
the week ending November 7, 2020, just under 21 million people have
applied for unemployment insurance, and during the week ending

72. Sarah Geoghegan et al., Vaccine Safety: Myths and Misinformation, 11 FRONTIERS
MICROBIOLOGY, Mar. 2020, at 5; Frank DeStefano et al., Principal Controversies in Vaccine Safety
in the United States, 69 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 726 (2019). But see Parasidis, supra note
59, at 2210, 2223–2225, 2227 (concluding systems are insufficient). Note, however, that the
article downplays the role of the active monitoring systems described above, id. at 2223–2225,
and only briefly mentioned one of the four advisory committees described here. Id. at 2210
fn.460, 2217, 2227.
73. Vaccines are Safe, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., https://sites.nationalacademies
.org/BasedOnScience/vaccines-are-safe/index.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2020); see also FE Andre
et al., Vaccination Greatly Reduces Disease, Disability, Death and Inequity Worldwide, 86 BULLETIN OF THE
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 140, 140 (2008), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pm
c/articles/PMC2647387/pdf/07-040089.pdf (“[I]ndependent experts and WHO have shown
that vaccines are far safer than therapeutic medicines. Modern research has spurred the
development of less reactogenic products, such as acellular pertussis vaccines and rabies vaccines
produced in cell culture. Today, vaccines have an excellent safety record and most “vaccine
scares” have been shown to be false alarms.”).
74. Emiliano Rodrigues Mega, COVID has Killed More than One Million People. How Many More
Will Die? NATURE (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02762-y.
75. CDC Covid Data Tracker United States Covid-19 Cases and Deaths by State, U.S. CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/casesupdates/cases-in-us.html (Dec. 2, 2020); Coronavirus Resource Center, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. &
MED., https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/us-map (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
76. Stephanie Pappas, How COVID-19 Deaths are Counted, SCI. AM. (May 19, 2020),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-covid-19-deaths-are-counted1/.
77. Coronavirus Disease (Covid-19) Situation Report – 127, WORLD HEALTH ORG., (May 26,
2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-report
s/20200526-covid-19-sitrep-127.pdf?sfvrsn=7b6655ab_8.
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November 21, 2020 778,000 filed initial claims.78 Since the beginning of the
crisis, hundreds of thousands of small business have closed and others are at
risk of closure.79 Children are out of school and daycare, imposing burdens
on families and depriving children of a variety of important social goods.80
The costs are not evenly distributed, exacerbating existing inequalities.81 The
harms, also, disproportionally (though not exclusively) fall on minority
groups.82 The economic impacts are not limited to the United States
economy—many other countries are struggling as well.83
The virus, both directly and through diverse disruptive impacts, poses real
risks to people’s health and lives.84 For individuals who already live on the
margins of poverty, losing a job means they may not be able to cover all their
basic needs.85 Some may face the loss of their home, and homelessness—or
poverty generally—worsens health outcomes.86 Not taking measures to
78. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims 1,
4, 6 (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf.
79. STEVEN HAMILTON, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, POLICY PROPOSAL 2020-14, FROM
SURVIVAL TO REVIVAL: HOW TO HELP SMALL BUSINESSES THROUGH THE COVID-19 CRISIS
4 (Brookings Inst. 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/PP_Ham
ilton_Final.pdf.; MICHAEL POWE & MATTHEW WAGNER, NAT’L MAIN ST. CTR., THE IMPACT
OF COVID-19 ON SMALL BUSINESSES: FINDINGS FROM MAIN STREET AMERICAN’S SMALL
BUSINESS SURVEY 3–4 (2020), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/NMSC/390e
0055-2395-4d3b-af60-81b53974430d/UploadedImages/Resource_Center/COVID_19/NM
SC57_MSA_COVID19IMAPCTSURVEY_F.pdf.
80. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., REOPENING K-12 SCHOOLS DURING THE
COVID-19 PANDEMIC: PRIORITIZING HEALTH, EQUITY, AND COMMUNITIES 25–31 (2020);
Russel M. Viner et al., School Closure and Management Practices During Coronavirus Outbreaks Including
Covid-19: A Rapid Systematic Review, in 4 LANCET CHILD & ADOLESCENT HEALTH 397, 398 (2020).
81. Emily A. Benfer & Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Justice Strategies to Combat COVID-19:
Protecting Vulnerable Communities During a Pandemic, HEALTHAFFAIRS: BLOG (Mar. 19, 2020),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200319.757883/full/.
82. Monica Webb Hooper et al., COVID-19 and Racial/Ethnic Disparities, 323 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 2466, 2466 (2020); Cato T. Laurencin & Aneesah McClinton, The COVID-19 Pandemic:
A Call to Action to Identify and Address Racial and Ethnic Disparities, 7 J. RACIAL ETHNIC HEALTH
DISPARITIES 398, 398–400 (2020).
83. Peterson K. Ozili & Thankom Arun, Spillover of COVID-19: Impact on the Global
Economy 1–3, 5–14, 20 (Mar. 27, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol
3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3584485_code1996195.pdf?abstractid=3562570&mirid=1; COVID19’s Historic Economic Impact, In the U.S. and Abroad, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV.: HUB (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://hub.jhu.edu/2020/04/16/coronavirus-impact-on-european-american-economies/.
84. Martin McKee & David Stuckler, If the World Fails to Protect the Economy, COVID-19
Will Damage Health Not Just Now but Also in the Future, 26 NATURE MED. 640 (2020).
85. Benfer & Wiley, supra note 81.
86. Id.
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contain spread would not necessarily spare the economy: people would
respond to an uncontrolled pandemic by taking actions that would harm the
economy.87 The high costs of the pandemic and its containment—measured
in lives, health, and economic harms—put pressure on policymakers and
scientists to find a quick solution.88 The long-term solution, experts agree, is
having a safe, effective vaccine that will ideally prevent COVID-19 from
infecting people and spreading throughout the population.89 The public and
business interests are also anxiously awaiting a vaccine.90 Going through the
regular process means a long wait for the vaccine. Understandably,
policymakers—and citizens—are concerned about that long wait.91
Policymakers correctly point out that while rushing a vaccine through the
process has risks, so does waiting until the usual testing is complete.92 Letting
COVID-19 rage unchecked will kill many and cause additional harms through
economic consequences.93 On the other hand are the costs of having an unsafe
vaccine. First, an unsafe vaccine can directly harm people. During previous
vaccine scandals, like the Cutter Incident or the 1976 swine flu episode, people
died or were paralyzed by a vaccine.94 There is also some risk that a COVID19 vaccine could predispose recipients to a more severe case of the disease.95
Dr. Douglas Green of St. Jude’s Research Hospital explained:
In 1966, a large trial of a vaccine for Respiratory Syncytial Virus (RSV) found that the
immunized cohort actually faired [sic] significantly worse upon infection. Additionally,
many worry that the same may occur with some SARS-CoV2 vaccines. . . . There are

87. Sergio Correia et al., Pandemics Depress the Economy, Public Health Interventions Do
Not: Evidence from the 1918 Flu 1–2, 12–13, 15–16 (June 5, 2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID3624939_code2423067.pdf?abstractid
=3561560&mirid=1; Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Flattening the Pandemic and Recession Curves, in
MITIGATING THE COVID ECONOMIC CRISIS: ACT FAST AND DO WHATEVER IT TAKES 31, 35,
38 (Richard Baldwin & Beatrice Weder di Mauro eds., 2020).
88. Stanley A. Plotkin & Arthur Caplan, Extraordinary Diseases Require Extraordinary Solutions,
38 VACCINE 3987, 3897 (2020).
89. Id.
90. See Sarah Zhang, A Vaccine Reality Check, ATLANTIC (July 25, 2020, 7:56 PM)
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/07/covid-19-vaccine-reality-check/6
14566/.
91. Moncef Slaoui & Matthew Hepburn, Developing Safe and Effective Covid Vaccines —
Operation Warp Speed’s Strategy and Approach, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1701 (Oct. 29, 2020).
92. Bijayeeta Deb et al., Current Global Vaccine and Drug Efforts Against COVID-19: Pros and
Cons of Bypassing Animal Trials, 45 J. BIOSCIENCES 82 (2020).
93. Id.
94. Trogen et al., supra note 13.
95. Douglas R. Green, Editorial, SARS-CoV2 Vaccines: Slow is Fast, SCI. ADVANCES (May 22,
2020), https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/early/2020/05/22/Sciadv.abc7428.full.
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potential reasons why an immune response to a vaccine can predispose an individual to a
worse outcome upon infection. One is the phenomenon of antibody-dependent
enhancement (ADE). In this effect, antibodies that bind to the virus also bind to antibody
receptors on cells, facilitating uptake and infection of the cell bearing the receptors. ADE
was observed for vaccines against Dengue, Ebola, and HIV. As recently as 2017, a largescale efficacy trial of a Dengue vaccine resulted in ADE in vaccinated children.
Troublingly, ADE was also seen in vaccines for a feline coronavirus. There is also
evidence for ADE in SARS-CoV. Studies show that rodent and human antibodies to the
S protein enhance infection in vitro. However, several small preclinical studies of a
SARS-CoV vaccine in rhesus monkeys failed to observe evidence of ADE.96

Testing must assure that a vaccine is not worse than the disease and does
not predispose the recipient to worse cases going forward. But that comparison
is not as straightforward as it may seem. Every vaccine is approved on a risk–
benefit analysis: are the risks greater than the benefits? All vaccines carry at
least a theoretical risk of a severe allergic reaction, which if untreated can be
fatal; though, that risk is extremely small.97 The polio vaccine used in the
United States between 1961–1997 (and a few years afterward, since the
process of transition was gradual) was the oral polio vaccine (OPV).98 OPV
causes paralysis in recipients in about one in 2.4 million doses.99 However, the
benefits of the vaccine were considered high enough to justify the risk.100 For
a COVID-19 vaccine, too, the question is not simply whether it will have any
rare hidden risks, but whether the potential of rare hidden risks is higher than
the risks of not giving the vaccine. That comparison depends on several
factors. During the pandemic, when cases are high and the effects of the
pandemic are severe and visible, we may tolerate a higher risk than when the

96. Id. (“One SARS-CoV2 vaccine, employing inactivated virus, was tested in several large
cohorts of rhesus monkeys, with substantial efficacy and no evidence of ADE. While this is
clearly encouraging, the need to ensure that any vaccine is, indeed, safe is of vital importance.”).
97. Michael M. McNeil et al., Risk of Anaphylaxis After Vaccination in Children and Adults, 137
J. ALLERGY & CLINICAL IMMUNOLOGY 868, 871, 874–75, 877 (2016) (noting that the risk is
around one per million overall, and for some vaccines the risk is purely theoretical).
98. Poliomyelitis Prevention in the United States: Introduction of a Sequential Vaccination Schedule of
Inactivated Poliovirus Vaccine Followed by Oral Poliovirus Vaccine; Recommendations of the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Jan. 24, 1997), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00046568.htm.
99. Id.
100. Notice to Readers: Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices:
Revised Recommendations for Routine Poliomyelitis Vaccination, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION (July 16, 1999), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm48
27a4.htm.
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case rate declines.101 But this, too, needs to be examined more closely. First,
the risks of the vaccine may not be equally distributed with the risks of the
disease. For example, the risks of COVID-19, though they exist in every age
group, vary—the risk of direct death or severe outcomes increases with age.102
At the same time, there is growing evidence of a special inflammatory
syndrome in children caused by COVID-19.103 The highest risks associated
with a new vaccine, however, may be in a group for whom the risks of
COVID-19 are low. Is it ethical to impose a created risk on one group to
protect another? Incomplete testing means we may not know who bears the
risk, or the nature and severity of uncommon risks. Further, scientists,
policymakers, and members of the public do not treat the risks of vaccines as
equivalent to the risks of the disease. As mentioned above, in 1998, a rotavirus
vaccine with a 1:10,000 risk of a severe side effect was taken off the market
because that risk was deemed too high to be acceptable in a vaccine—even
though the risks of the disease were higher than 1:10,000 severe harm.104
Giving a vaccine to a healthy person is not the same as treating someone who
is sick, and the standard is not simply whether the risks are higher than the
benefits. Since modern routine childhood vaccines have extremely low risks,
our safety expectations from vaccines are high. We have already seen several
examples where rush led to potential harm in the context of the COVID-19
pandemic. For example, the FDA authorized hydroxychloroquine (HCQ)
after the medication was touted as a cure for COVID-19, even though there
was insufficient evidence for doing so.105 The FDA pulled the aforementioned
101. See Frank Destefano et al., Vaccine Safety, in PLOTKIN’S VACCINES 1584, 1595–96
(Stanley A. Plotkin et al. eds., 7th ed. 2018).
102. Dale Fisher & David Heymann, Q&A: The Novel Coronavirus Outbreak Causing Covid19, 18 BMC MED. 57 (2020).
103. See Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Doctors Race to Understand Rare Inflammatory Condition
Associated with Coronavirus in Young People, SCI. MAG. (May 21, 2020, 4:10 PM), https://www.scienc
emag.org/news/2020/05/doctors-race-understand-rare-inflammatory-condition-associatedcoronavirus-young-people; Crystal Phend, Targeting Immune Responses in Kids’ COVID-19
Inflammatory Disorder, MEDPAGE TODAY (May 21, 2020), https://www.medpagetoday.com/infec
tiousdisease/covid19/86614. The CDC labeled it “multisystem inflammatory syndrome in
children,” and pointed out that most children recover with treatment. See for Parents: Multisystem
Inflammatory Syndrome in Children (MIS-C) associated with Covid-19, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/ch
ildren/mis-c.html (May 20, 2020),
104. Withdrawal of Rotavirus Vaccine Recommendation, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Nov. 5, 1999), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4843a5.htm.
105. See Jinoos Yazdany & Alfred H.J. Kim, Use of Hydroxychloroquine and Chloroquine During
the COVID-19 Pandemic: What Every Clinician Should Know, 172 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 754,
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authorization after increasing amounts of data suggested no benefit from using
HCQ to treat COVID-19.106 The initial recommendation, in the meantime,
was not harmless. HCQ as a treatment had risks—and touting it as a cure for
COVID-19 created availability-related risks for those who need it to treat
diseases for which HCQ actually helps.107 Panic prescribing is a real risk
associated with the pandemic, as is the risk of panic approval of vaccines with
negative results.108 Political pressures facing the administration during an
election year exacerbate such risks.109 These pressures already led to clear and
extensive political interference in public health agencies, and raise concerns
about hasty vaccine approval.110 An unsafe vaccine creates harms that are
ethically—and publicly—unacceptable. This can result in a lack of trust
towards other vaccines, which can lead to lower vaccination rates and
attendant risks of outbreaks for other diseases.111 Additionally, unsafe vaccines
negatively affect the willingness to comply with other public health
recommendations that are dependent on trust.
III.

OUR OPTIONS

There are multiple ways to increase the speed of vaccine development.
None are perfect or unproblematic; some are reasonable, some ethically
754–55 (2020); Fact Sheet for Health Care Providers Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) of
Hydroxychloroquine Sulfate Supplied From the Strategic National Stockpile for Treatment of COVID-19 in
Certain Hospitalized Patients, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.fda.gov
/media/136537/download.
106. Letter from Dinese M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Gary
L. Disbrow, Dir., Biomedical Advanced Rsch. & Dev. Auth., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Servs. 1–2 (June 15, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/138945/download; see also Joe Palca,
FDA Withdraws Emergency Use Authorization for Hydroxychloroquine, NPR (June 15, 2020, 2:30 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/06/15/877498151/fda-with
draws-emergency-use-authorization-for-hydroxychloroquine.
107. Camela Thompson, Life with Lupus: Trump’s Hydroxychloroquine Hype Puts My Treatment
— and Himself — at Risk, STAT NEWS (May 20, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/20/
hydroxychloroquine-trump-hype-jeopardize-supply-may-harm-him/.
108. Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., ‘Panic Prescribing’ Untested Coronavirus Treatments: A Danger
to Patients Today and Tomorrow, HEALTHAFFAIRS: BLOG (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.healthaffair
s.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200330.265604/full/.
109. Kevin Liptak & Kaitlan Collins, Trump Puts Pressure on FDA for Coronavirus Silver Bullet
Ahead of Election Day, CNN (Sept. 3, 2020, 9:34 PM) https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/03/politics
/white-house-fda-coronavirus-vaccine/index.html.
110. Dan Diamond, Trump Officials Interfered with CDC Reports on Covid-19, POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/11/exclusive-trump-officials-interfered-with-cdcreports-on-covid-19-412809 (Sept. 12, 2020 11:11 AM).
111. Trogen et al., supra note 13.
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challenging, and some outright dangerous. Dangers come in two varieties:
some approaches increase the risk of ending with an unsafe or ineffective
vaccine, a result that does not improve the pandemic situation. Others do
not risk the final result but can dramatically increase the risks to trial
participants. One caveat: this section focuses on the process before licensing.
I see no reason to relax the oversight and requirements in place after a
vaccine is licensed and, indeed, it is particularly important to preserve
oversight and respect the role of advisory committees in the process and
assuring transparency towards them. Oversight mechanisms after licensing
should carefully monitor any licensed COVID-19 vaccines. As a final
preliminary point, it is important to acknowledge the institutional framework
the Administration put in place to oversee vaccine development. To
coordinate the process of vaccine approval, the Administration created
“Operation Warp Speed.”112 Operation Warp Speed is in charge of
coordinating between the many actors involved—
[c]omponents of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), including the
Centers for Disease and Prevention (CDC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
the National Control Institutes of Health (NIH), and the Biomedical Advanced
Research and Development Authority (BARDA), and the Department of
Defense . . . private firms and other federal agencies, including the Department of
Agriculture, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Veterans Affairs.113

I find the title unfortunate, suggesting as it does rushing ahead without
caution. However, it is a positive thing to have a government entity
coordinating something as large as the effort to create and provide vaccines to
three hundred thousand plus citizens. The Administration chose a veteran
military man and a pharmaceutical insider to lead the process.114 Nonprofits
complained to the HHS Inspector General about the appointment of Dr.
Slaoui, who has direct investments and roles with a variety of pharmaceutical
companies. In July 2020, the Inspector General rejected the complaints, ruling
Dr. Slaoui can remain in that role.115 Although this choice raises questions
about the project, other participants are veteran civil servants with extensive

112. Fact Sheet: Explaining Operation Warp Speed, supra note 1.
113. Id.
114. See id. (appointing HHS Secretary Alex Azar and Defense Secretary Mark Esper,
Dr. Moncef Slaoui, and General Gustave F. Perna).
115. Christopher Rowland, Chief of White House’s ‘Operation Warp Speed’ Vaccine Effort Can
Keep Investing in Pharma Firms, Under IG Ruling, WASH. POST (July 14, 2020, 08:24 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/14/chief-white-houses-operationwarp-speed-vaccine-effort-can-keep-investing-pharma-firms-under-ig-ruling/.
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expertise in the area; like Dr. Peter Marks, who directs the FDA’s CBER.116
The main concern I see about Operation Warp Speed is not its leadership, but
the lack of transparency with which, apparently, it has been operating. This
will be addressed again later.
So, what are the options? A straightforward approach that has been used
before is to conduct multiple testing phases together. For example, several
companies are conducting Phase 1 and Phase 2 trials simultaneously.117
Overlapping trial stages are not unusual, and there may be good reasons to go
back and forth. For example, there may be something that needs testing in a
smaller, more intensive trial while a large trial is going on. In addition, as
mentioned previously, Phase 1 trials do not typically provide a lot of
information about the vaccine, so combining Phase 1 trials with Phase 2 trials
may speed up the development process. Another time-saving approach is to
prepare large trials early, which is a reasonable and likely uncontroversial step.118
While an early set up has financial risks, it will not undermine vaccine
safety or effectiveness.119 As further suggested in an editorial, these could be
done as “adaptive randomized-controlled” trials:
These trials can be structured to evaluate multiple vaccine candidates against a
common control group and can shift enrollment based on which vaccines are most
promising. Vaccines would be selected based on their promise in early studies and how
quickly their manufacturing can be scaled. With so many patients developing mild or
no symptoms, clinical trials will need to be large. But this is the best shot at quickly
identifying safe and effective vaccines.120

116. Trump Administration Announces Framework and Leadership for 'Operation Warp Speed', U.S. DEP’T
(May 15, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/05/15/tr
ump-administration-announces-framework-and-leadership-for-operation-warp-speed.html.
117. Coronavirus Vaccine Trials – Updating Current Studies Across the World, SKEPTICAL RAPTOR:
BLOG (July 8, 2020), https://www.skepticalraptor.com/skepticalraptorblog.php/coronavirusvaccine-trials-updating-current-studies-across-world/.
118. Arthur Allen, Op-Ed, While the U.S. Rushes to Develop a COVID-19 Vaccine, Here’s What
Science Tells Us, L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/
2020-05-21/coronavirus-vaccine-testing-approval. For example:
Under a proposal under discussion by a committee set up by the National Institutes of
Health, each of four or five experimental vaccines would be tested on about 20,000 trial
participants with a placebo group of 10,000 for each vaccine. Some 50 U.S. medical
centers—and perhaps an equal number overseas—would participate in these trials.
Id.
119. Id.
120. Luciana Borio & Scott Gottlieb, Opinion, A Fast Coronavirus Vaccine, Without Cutting
Corners, WALL ST. J. (May 31, 2020, 3:47 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-fast-coronaviru
s-vaccine-without-cutting-corners-11590954444?mod=opinion_lead_pos8.
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
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These trials are costly and, when they are government funded, costs that
usually fall on companies—costs of testing vaccines that may well never make
it to market—will fall on the taxpayers.121 But in the context of a harmful,
disruptive pandemic, that may be justified. That said, these trials need to be
focused on the best vaccine candidates from a scientific perspective. Political
selection of vaccine candidates to be supported by the government—or those
receiving production support—undermines legitimacy and can directly
counter the search for a better vaccine.122 In the United States, coordinated
by Operation Warp Speed, the Biomedical Advanced Research and
Development Authority (BARDA) is collaborating with three different
companies—Moderna, Janssen Research (which is part of Johnson &
Johnson), and AstraZeneca—on clinical trials.123 The trials themselves are
overseen and regulated by the FDA (with a secondary role to NIH), and
companies have to work out problems with those agencies.124 Also costly,
but not controversial from the point of view of safety, is setting up production
before trials are complete—something suggested both in the United
Kingdom and in the United States.125 In the United States, BARDA is
managing the preparation for scaling up production.126 These approaches,
too, carry an economic risk: preparing for production is costly, and if the
vaccine candidate in question does not succeed in a clinical trial, the
investment would have been for nothing. The investment itself does not,

121. See Fact Sheet: Explaining Operation Warp Speed, supra note 1 (demonstrating that the
government is funding the private companies).
122. Emanuel & Offit, supra note 4.
123. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., HHS Accelerates Clinical Trials,
Prepares for Manufacturing of COVID-19 Vaccines (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/abo
ut/news/2020/03/30/hhs-accelerates-clinical-trials-prepares-manufacturing-covid-19-vaccine
s.html; Trump Administration’s Operation Warp Speed Accelerates AstraZeneca COVID-19 Vaccine to be
Available Beginning in October, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (May 21, 2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/05/21/trump-administration-accelerates-astrazenec
a-covid-19-vaccine-to-be-available-beginning-in-october.html.
124. Marisa Taylor & Robin Respaut, Moderna Spars with U.S. Scientists Over COVID-19
Vaccine Trials, REUTERS (July 7, 2020, 7:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcoronavirus-moderna-exclusive/exclusive-moderna-spars-with-u-s-scientists-over-covid-19-vac
cine-trials-idUSKBN2481EU.
125. See Ian Sample, UK plans £38m Centre to Start Production of Coronavirus Vaccine, GUARDIAN
(May 17, 2020, 1:31 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/may/17/uk-plans38m-centre-to-start-production-of-coronavirus-vaccine (demonstrating the United Kingdom
approach); Christopher Rowland et al., Even Finding a Covid-19 Vaccine Won’t Be Enough to End the
Pandemic, WASH. POST (May 11, 2020, 4:16 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
2020/05/11/coronavirus-vaccine-global-supply/ (demonstrating the U.S. approach).
126. See Fact Sheet: Explaining Operation Warp Speed, supra note 1.
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however, create a risk of an unsafe outcome; though, it can create political
pressures on the participants and raise the stakes, making it tempting to hide
bad results. Such investments should be accompanied by careful oversight
of the companies whose vaccine candidates are chosen for this support.
Another potential approach is to permit use through an Emergency Use
Authorization (EUA) for vaccines that have successfully passed one or more
stages of trial in some circumstances.127 We can likely expect such requests
as soon as there is partial robust data that the vaccines in trials work,
assuming no major safety concerns are discovered because of the level of
harm the pandemic is causing. EUA requires a declaration by the HHS
Secretary that justifies issuing an EUA, following a determination of a
domestic, military, public health emergency or material threat.128 The
Secretary should then consult “(to the extent feasible and appropriate given
the applicable circumstances) with the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness
and Response (ASPR), the Director of the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), and the Director of CDC,” and if the statutory criteria have been met,
issue the authorization.129
The criteria to institute an EUA for “an unapproved medical product” are
where there are:
(1) Serious or life-threatening illness or condition caused by CBRN agent as set
forth in HHS declaration;
(2) Reasonable belief that the product may be effective in diagnosing, treating, or
preventing the illness or condition caused by the agent (based on totality of scientific data);
(3) The product’s known and potential benefits outweigh known and potential risks
when used for disease or condition; and
(4) There is no adequate approved, available alternative.130

In February 2020, the HHS Secretary announced an emergency
surrounding the pandemic, and approved a number of EUA for COVID-19related products, including “use of in vitro diagnostics for the detection and/or
diagnosis of COVID-19 (February 4, 2020), personal respiratory protective
devices (March 2, 2020), and other medical devices, including alternative

127. See John D. Blum & Jordan Paradise, Public Health Preparedness & Response: An Exercise in
Administrative Law, 20 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L., June 2018, at 15; Charles G. Kels, Dispensing
Medical Countermeasures: Emergency Use Authorities and Liability Protections, 13 HEALTH SEC. 139 (2015).
128. Blum & Paradise, supra note 127, at 15.
129. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEPT’ OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OMB
CONTROL NO. 0910-0595, EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION OF MEDICAL PRODUCTS AND
RELATED AUTHORITIES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS 6 (2017),
https://www.fda.gov/media/97321/download.
130. Id.
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products used as medical devices (March 24, 2020).”131 We can reasonably
expect requests for such use of vaccines to start rolling in as soon as the data
supports them. This is an approach whose desirability really depends on the
details. Vaccines were approved for emergency use before in analogous
circumstances, though not through an EUA. For example, a meningococcal
B vaccine licensed elsewhere, but not in the United States, was used during a
meningococcal outbreak in several college campuses.132 In 2014–2015, a
vaccine not yet approved for Ebola was allowed use during an outbreak in
Africa.133 The vaccine was later approved.134 Both cases involved an outbreak
of a potentially fatal disease, creating a vivid and visible life-threatening
emergency. In the COVID-19 context, an example could be an outbreak
overwhelming hospitals, which occurred in Italy and New York City, or an
outbreak in a high-risk environment like a nursing home.135 The legitimacy of
this approach would also depend on the evidence on the potential benefits
compared to the potential risks. The meningococcal B vaccine underwent
several clinical trials, and was approved—and used—in Europe after enough
safety data was provided to European regulatory authorities to justify it, and

131. Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Emergency Use Authorizations for Medical
Device, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/emergency-useauthorizations-medical-devices/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19-emergency-use-authoriz
ations-medical-devices (Aug. 3, 2020).
132. See Blair Capitano et al., Experience Implementing a University-Based Mass Immunization
Program in Response to a Meningococcal B Outbreak, in 15 HUM. VACCINES & IMMUNOTHERAPIES 717,
717 (2019); JoNel Aleccia, Emergency Meningitis Vaccine Will be Imported to Halt Ivy League Outbreak,
NBC NEWS (Nov. 15, 2013, 4:38 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/healthmain/emergencymeningitis-vaccine-will-be-imported-halt-ivy-league-outbreak-2D11603651.
133. Marissa Fritz, Drug Approval During a Public Health Crisis, REG. REV. (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://www.theregreview.org/2020/02/11/fritz-drug-approval-during-public-health-crisis/.
134. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., First FDA-Approved Vaccine for the
Prevention of Ebola Virus Disease, Marking a Critical Milestone in Public Health
Preparedness and Response (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressannouncements/first-fda-approved-vaccine-prevention-ebola-virus-disease-marking-criticalmilestone-public-health.
135. See Carrie Arnold, New York City’s Coronavirus Outbreak is Already Overwhelming Hospitals,
NEWSCIENTIST (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2239247-new-yorkcitys-coronavirus-outbreak-is-already-overwhelming-hospitals/#; Sharon Begley, A Plea From
Doctors in Italy: To Avoid Covid-19 Disaster, Treat More Patients at Home, STAT NEWS (Mar. 21, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/21/coronavirus-plea-from-italy-treat-patients-at-home/;
Christina Maxouris, The Most Alarming Coronavirus Numbers in Some States are in Prisons and Nursing
Homes, CNN (May 7, 2020, 5:47 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/07/us/coronaviruscases-prisons-nursing-homes/index.html.
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during its use, no new safety concerns emerged.136 The situation for Ebola
vaccines was different. A candidate vaccine “was given to at-risk HCW/FLWs
and at-risk adults and children during the 2014–2016 West African outbreak
during clinical trials using investigational expanded access protocols,” during
an efficacy trial in Guinea that showed very high efficacy, justified by the
severity of the disease.137 During the 2018 and 2019 Ebola outbreaks in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the vaccine was not yet licensed, but
there was evidence of human trials supporting its use.138 Even in the DRC,
there was initial hesitancy to use the vaccine in lactating and pregnant
women—in which the vaccine had not been tested—but the severe risks
allowed for the vaccine to be used on that population after some debate.139
Similar questions about use of COVID-19 vaccines in pregnancy may come
up in the U.S.; the FDA is reluctant to allow trials in pregnant women, and for
COVID-19 there is no special reason to deviate from that rule. Though, there
could be a question about making these vaccines available to that population
without such trials.140 In other words, emergency use decisions depend not
only on the existence of an emergency but also on other factors, such as the
danger from the disease and the already existing data on the vaccine. Both
Ebola and meningococcal disease have higher rates of mortality than COVID19, and meningococcal has a substantial risk of long-lasting disability even in
survivors.141 Allowing emergency use of a vaccine with very little safety data
may be less likely for COVID-19—but that balance may shift as more data
accumulates. An obvious concern there is that political pressures will lead to
approval of emergency use of COVID-19 vaccines where there is no objective

136. See Aleccia, supra note 132.
137. Jenny A. Walldorf et al., Considerations for Use of Ebola Vaccine During an Emergency
Response, 37 VACCINE 7190, 7195 (2019).
138. See Second Ebola Vaccine to Complement “Ring Vaccination” Given Green Light in DRC,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/23-092019-second-ebola-vaccine-to-complement-ring-vaccination-given-green-light-in-drc.
139. Archana Asundi & Nahid Bhadelia, Making Emergency Use of Experimental Vaccines Safer,
22 AM. MED. ASS’N J. OF ETHICS 43, 44 (2020).
140. See Sam F. Halabi, Zika and the Regulatory Regime for Licensing Vaccines for use During
Pregnancy, 26 ANN. HEALTH L., Summer 2017, at 20–21.
141. See U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND
PREVENTION OF VACCINE-PREVENTABLE DISEASES 232, 241 (2015); Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ebolavirus-disease; Mortality Analyses, JOHNS HOPKINS CORONAVIRUS RES. CTR., https://coronavir
us.jhu.edu/data/mortality (Dec. 2, 2020, 3:00 AM).
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justification. Arguably, that has already happened with HCQ.142 Whether
political pressures will lead to emergency use approval in the COVID-19
context is under extensive debate, the result of which will be unclear when this
Article goes to publication; but it is a concern.143 Another step that can and
should occur early on is setting up work groups by the different oversight
committees once vaccine candidates advance in the trials. The NIH already
set up multiple expert committees to work on the different steps.144 An
executive committee chaired by Dr. Francis Collins, the NIH Director, with a
co-chair from industry Dr. Paul Stoffels, from Johnson & Johnson, and other
officials—most from the government but some from pharmaceutical
companies—lead this effort.145 Under it are four working groups: a Preclinical
Working Group, a Therapeutics Clinical Working Group, a Clinical Trial
Capacity Working Group, and a Vaccines Working Group.146 The Vaccines
Working Group involves pharmaceutical industry members (like Dr. Paula
Annunziato from Merck and Dr. Tal Zaks from Moderna), public servants
(like Dr. Douglas Lowy from NIH, and Dr. Peter Marks from the FDA),
experts from abroad (like Dr. Marco Cavaleri from the European Medicines
Agency), and academics (like Dr. Beth Bell from the University of Washington,
who also leads the ACIP working group on COVID-19 vaccines; Dr. Peter
Hotez from Baylor College of Medicine; and Dr. Paul Offit from the School

142. See John Timmer, FDA Approves the Emergency Use of Chloroquine for COVID-19,
ARSTECHNICA (Mar. 31, 2020, 4:52 PM), https://arstechnica.com/science/2020/03/fdaapproves-the-emergency-use-of-chloroquine-for-covid-19/; Nicholos Florko, Why was an Obscure
Federal Bureaucrat Involved in Trump’s Emergency Hydroxychloroquine Authorization?, STAT NEWS (Apr.
24, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/24/why-rick-bright-involved-hydroxychloroq
uine/ (supporting the view that this was unjustified comes from the FDA’s warning against use
of the drug outside hospital settings, issued less than a month after the emergency use
authorization); FDA Cautions Against Use of Hydroxychloroquine or Chloroquine for COVID-19 Outside of
the Hospital Setting or a Clinical Trial Due to Risk of Heart Rhythm Problems, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-safety-and-availability/fda-cautions-against-use-hydroxychl
oroquine-or-chloroquine-covid-19-outside-hospital-setting-or (July 1, 2020).
143. Robert Califf et al., 7 Former FDA Commissioners: The Trump Administration is Undermining
the Credibility of the FDA, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2020, 5:16 PM) https://www.washingtonpost.co
m/opinions/2020/09/29/former-fda-commissioners-coronavirus-vaccine-trump/; Kashmira
Gander, Trump Must Stop Criticizing Scientists Amid COVID-19 Vaccine Talks: Experts to FDA,
NEWSWEEK (Sept. 26, 2020, 11:07 AM) https://www.newsweek.com/trump-criticizingscientists-coronavirus-vaccine-1534439.
144. Governance, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov/research-training/medic
al-research-initiatives/activ/leadership (Sept. 11, 2020).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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of Medicine at the University of Pennsylvania).147 ACIP, as mentioned, set up
a work group to monitor COVID-19 vaccines in April 2020.148
More controversial is the question of whether to allow
challenge/rechallenge trials.149 Challenge/rechallenge trials involve
intentionally exposing consenting volunteers who received the vaccine to
the virus; i.e., injecting them with live COVID-19 virus, under medical
supervision.150 This technique is advantageous because it does not depend
on trial participants’ natural exposure to COVID-19—something that
could take time, especially in areas where the pandemic is under control.
Several experts strongly recommend challenge/rechallenge trials. 151
Experts point out that there is low risk and high reward when these trials
are limited to young volunteers, and the benefits of having a vaccine sooner
are meaningful, including in terms of lives saved.152 The problem, as
discussed by some of these experts, is that challenge/rechallenge trials ask
people to “take on risk of severe illness or death.” 153 The risk is especially
high since there is much unknown about COVID-19 and there is no good
treatment for it.154 Nonetheless, supporters argue these trials will save
lives.155 Volunteers are lining up for it: a grassroots hotline has signed up
thousands of people saying they are willing to take the risk (though, such

147. Vaccines Working Group, U.S. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov/research
-training/medical-research-initiatives/activ/vaccines-working-group (Oct. 20, 2020).
148. Michael Devitt, Coronavirus Remains Front and Center at June ACIP Meeting, AM. ACAD. OF
FAM. PHYSICIANS (July 1, 2020, 3:00 PM), https://www.aafp.org/news/health-of-the-public/
20200701acipjunemtg.html.
149. See Vaccine Challenge Studies—Can it Speed up Coronavirus Vaccine Licensing, SKEPTICAL
RAPTOR: BLOG (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.skepticalraptor.com/skepticalraptorblog.php/
vaccine-challenge-studies-can-it-speed-up-coronavirus-vaccine-licensing/.
150. WORLD HEALTH ORG., KEY CRITERIA FOR THE ETHICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF
COVID-19 HUMAN CHALLENGE STUDIES 1 (2020) [hereinafter HUMAN CHALLENGE
STUDIES], https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/331976/WHO-2019-nCoVEthics_criteria-2020.1-eng.pdf?ua=1.
151. See Plotkin & Caplan, supra note 88; Nir Eyal et al., Human Challenge Studies to Accelerate
Coronavirus Vaccine Licensure, 221 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1752, 1754 (2020).
152. See Plotkin & Caplan, supra note 88.
153. See Eyal et al., supra note 151.
154. See Shayla Love, People Are Willing to Risk Their Lives for a COVID Vaccine. Should We
Let Them?, VICE (Apr. 28, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/5dm7na/w
hy-intentionally-infecting-people-with-coronavirus-could-be-worth-it; Carolyn Y. Johnson,
Inside the Extraordinary Race to Invent a Coronavirus Vaccine, WASH. POST (May 3, 2020, 3:57 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2020/05/02/coronavirus-vaccine/.
155. See Plotkin & Caplan, supra note 88; Eyal et al, supra note 151 at 1753–54.
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signing up is no substitute for a fully informed consent process).156 Another
challenge is that to be ethical, challenge/rechallenge studies should consist
of healthy, young volunteers—people for whom the risks of COVID-19 are
low.157 But results from young volunteers would not necessarily teach us
about the effect of tested vaccines in high-risk populations, such as the
elderly. For example, influenza vaccines are much less effective in older
people than in younger ones, and special variations of influenza vaccines
are developed for that population.158 Similarly, COVID-19 vaccines
shown to be effective in young volunteers in challenge/rechallenge studies
would not signify similar protection of an older population, those that are
most at risk of harm from the disease. An additional risk is a setback during
the challenge/rechallenge trials, such as the death of a participant from
COVID-19, which could undermine vaccine development—even if the
vaccine did not directly cause the setback. 159 Allowing an EUA based on
antibody data alone would be highly problematic as well (something which,
to my knowledge, has not been done before). At this point, the level of
antibodies needed to protect against severe COVID-19 and the level that
protects against infecting others is unclear—the link between antibody
levels and protection can be complex, and we do not yet have that data for
COVID-19 vaccines, so acting on that alone can lead to unsupported
decisions.160 Additionally, the mutation rate and effect of the virus, both of
which can contribute to a less viable vaccine, is also uncertain. 161 If a
mutation is more infectious than another, the vaccine may not target the
more virulent form of the virus.162 If the mutation rate is much higher than
predicted, then a vaccine could be ineffective within a year or even just a
156. See HUMAN CHALLENGE STUDIES, supra note 150 at 1, 5; Ewen Callaway, Hundreds of
People Volunteer to be Infected with Coronavirus, NATURE (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.nature.com/a
rticles/d41586-020-01179-x.
157. See HUMAN CHALLENGE STUDIES, supra note 150, at 3.
158. Flu & People 65 Years and Older, U.S. CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/highrisk/65over.htm (Sept. 22, 2020). See generally Vaccine Effectiveness:
How Well do the Flu Vaccines Work?, U.S. CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/vaccines-work/vaccineeffect.htm#older-vaccinated (Jan. 3, 2020).
159. Michael Rosenblatt, Human Challenge Trials with Live Coronavirus Aren’t the Answer to a
Covid-19 Vaccine, STAT NEWS (June 23, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/06/23/challen
ge-trials-live-coronavirus-speedy-covid-19-vaccine (raising this and other points).
160. See “Immunity Passports” in the Context of Covid-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 24,
2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/immunity-passports-in-thecontext-of-covid-19.
161. See Ewen Callaway, The Coronovirus is Mutating – Does it Matter?, NATURE (Sept. 16,
2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02544-6.
162. Id.
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few months.163 Committing too soon to one company producing vaccines
is just as problematic; we do not know which vaccine candidate will succeed
in trials. The UK may have done just that when the government
committed large sums of money to the production of one candidate vaccine
that is still in early stages of testing.164 The U.S. government addressed this,
in part, by choosing four companies with which to partner on the vaccine
development process.165 But those are still only four, and it is not clear
whether the government would be willing—or able—to admit error and
change if needed. It is important to remember, though, that most vaccines
do not rely on government money to develop, and that the larger vaccine
companies can—and are—going ahead with their trials without
government support.166 Government support allows smaller companies—
who would have had to contract with a large company in order to reach
testing—to go ahead without that support.167 Still, the choices need to be
data driven; if a company’s results do not show that its vaccine candidate is
safe and effective, money devoted to production may be better spent by
rechanneling it to a more promising candidate. Similarly, skipping steps in
testing increases the risks of bad safety outcomes and may undermine the
use of a plausibly safe vaccine by decreasing trust. 168 Going to human
studies without animal studies would not necessarily mean that the final
vaccine is unsafe.169 If enough human testing occurs, we can still end up
with good data on safety and effectiveness. However, it could mean that
risks that could be discovered before humans were given the vaccine were
not discovered—creating additional risks for trial volunteers and presenting
163. Id.
164. See Sample, supra note 125 (showing the UK’s intent to invest in production).
165. See Fact Sheet: Explaining Operation Warp Speed, supra note 1.
166. Press Release, Nat’l Insts. Of Health, NIH to Launch Public-Private Partnership to
Speed COVID-19 Vaccine and Treatment Options (Apr. 17, 2020) https://www.nih.gov/news
-events/news-releases/nih-launch-public-private-partnership-speed-covid-19-vaccine-treatmen
t-options.
167. See Mark Terry, Moderna and Lonza Enter Large-Scale Manufacturing Deal for Potential
COVID-19 Vaccine, BIOSPACE (May 1, 2020) https://www.biospace.com/article/modernapartners-with-swiss-company-lonza-to-manufacture-covid-19-vaccine/.
168. See Sara Murray, Even Once a Vaccine Gets Approved, Big Hurdles Remain for Distribution,
CNN: POLITICS, https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/22/politics/coronavirus-vaccine-distribut
ion-concerns/index.html (noting that a third of Americans surveyed in May 2020 responded
that they would not get the vaccine even if it was “affordable and widely available”) (July 23,
2020, 12:58 PM).
169. Nicoletta Lanese, Researches Fast-Track Coronavirus Vaccine by Skipping Key Animal Testing
First, LIVE SCI. (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.livescience.com/coronavirus-vaccine-trial-noanimal-testing.html (noting that one of the vaccine candidates skipped animal trials).
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an opportunity for vaccine opponents who seek to frame all vaccines as
unsafe. Finally, a major problem to avoid is lack of transparency.
Oversight and advisory committees involved in the vaccine process—the
regular committee, and those created to focus on a COVID-19 vaccine—
need full, transparent information to do their job of meaningful oversight
and help lead us to a vaccine that is, in fact, safe and effective. In the June
2020 meeting of ACIP, Dr. Matthew Hepburn from Operation Warp
Speed spoke about the operation, but provided very few details on what is
actually going on.170 While there is a need to protect companies’ trade
secrets during vaccine production, oversight companies need information
to do their job and the public needs information to maintain trust. 171
Operation Warp Speed must preserve transparency towards the oversight
committees. In an unusual move, three vaccine companies voluntarily
published their trial protocols.172
While a laudable increase of
transparency, publishing trial protocols is not a substitute to agencies
sharing other information (like contract conditions).173 These committees
need information pertaining to the vaccine development process to achieve
a safe and effective vaccine.
IV.

MESSAGING CHALLENGES

Public trust is crucial in a pandemic; if the state wants to impose broadreaching measures, it has to rely either on voluntary compliance or on very
aggressive measures, which are costly and not always available or
effective.174 When it comes to a vaccination program, messaging matters.
In relation to the COVID-19 vaccine, we face at least three potential
messaging problems:
(1) Overselling: hyping the data, creating excessive expectations that
will then have to be corrected, undermining trust;

170. Murray, supra note 168.
171. See also Diana Kwon, How the Pharma Industry Pulled Off the Pivot to COVID-19,
THESCIENTIST (July 13, 2020), https://www.the-scientist.com/bio-business/how-thepharma-industry-pulled-off-the-pivot-to-covid-19-67719 (comparing how companies have
adopted collaborative information sharing processes and responded to requests to make their
research public).
172. Editorial, Covid Vaccine Confidence Requires Radical Transparency, NATURE, Sept. 29, 2020,
at 8, https://media.nature.com/original/magazine-assets/d41586-020-02738-y/d41586-02002738-y.pdf.
173. Id.
174. See Jay J. Van Bavel et al., Using Social and Behavioural Science to Support COVID-19
Pandemic Response, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 460, 466 (2020).
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(2) Under-sharing: not being transparent enough about what is being
done to ensure safety; not providing people enough information about
the process and results, so that people may mistrust even a vaccine that
actual data shows is safe and effective;
(3) Enabling misinformation, including by leaving false messages
without a counter.
We had already seen several instances of overselling vaccines by June 2020,
with potentially bad consequences. For example, early results published by
Moderna, a company producing one of the vaccine candidates, led to
headlines that strongly suggested the vaccine was effective.175 Scientists spoke
up to caution against over extrapolating from these press releases too
quickly.176 Among the problems with Moderna’s results was the fact that, out
of forty-five participants in the trial, Moderna provided data on only eight
participants who developed an antibody response, raising the question of what
other participant data showed.177 The fact that Moderna’s executives sold
large amounts of their stock in the company for large profits did not increase
confidence in the results, either.178 I would add that the data has since been
published in a peer reviewed article, the results were transparently set out—
and it looks like the hype problem did not recur with the publication of the
actual data.179 Similarly, results from the UK vaccine trials appear to have
175. Elizabeth Cohen, Early Results From Moderna Coronavirus Vaccine Trial Show Participants
Developed Antibodies Against the Virus, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/18/health/coronavi
rus-vaccine-moderna-early-results/index.html (May 18, 2020, 7:55 PM); Press Release,
Moderna, Moderna Announces Positive Interim Phase 1 Data for its mRNA Vaccine (mRNA1273) Against Novel Coronavirus (May 18, 2020), https://investors.modernatx.com/newsreleases/news-release-details/moderna-announces-positive-interim-phase-1-data-its-mrnavaccine; Helen Branswell, Vaccine Experts Say Moderna Didn’t Produce Data Critical to Assessing Covid19 Vaccine, STAT NEWS (May 19, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/19/vaccineexperts-say-moderna-didnt-produce-data-critical-to-assessing-covid-19-vaccine/.
176. See Branswell, supra note 175; Moderna Coronavirus Vaccine – Tempering the Breathless Pharma
Hype, SKEPTICAL RAPTOR: BLOG (May 19, 2020), https://www.skepticalraptor.com/skepticalra
ptorblog.php/moderna-coronavirus-vaccine-tempering-breathless-pharma-hype/.
177. Branswell, supra note 175; Jonathan Gardner, More Questions Than Answers as Moderna’s
Coronavirus Vaccine Speeds Ahead, BIOPHARMA DIVE (May 19, 2020), https://www.biopharmadive.
com/news/moderna-coronavirus-vaccine-data-more-questions/578229/.
178. Damian Garde, Moderna Executives Have Cashed Out $89M in Shares This Year, as Stock Price
has Soared on Vaccine Hopes, STAT NEWS (May 27, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/05/27
/moderna-executives-cashed-out-shares-stock-price-soared/.
179. See Lisa A. Jackson et. al, An mRNA Vaccine Against SARS-CoV-2 – Preliminary Report, 2020
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1920, https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMoa2022483?articleT
ools=true. The coverage I have seen for the article was more cautious than the first press release.
See, e.g., Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Moderna Stock Surges after Company Announces Promising Coronavirus
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been, initially, overstated.180 What was first touted as success in immunizing
monkeys was later questioned because the vaccine appeared to prevent
pneumonia in the monkeys but not infection, thus suggesting the vaccine
would not prevent spread of disease.181 These situations—initial promising
press releases following by dampening down—lead to loss of trust. Dr. Paul
Offit, a vaccine expert, described it as “science by press release,” and noted the
risk of speaking up before there is sufficient data.182
Another potential problem is not informing the public on how vaccine safety
is monitored and overseen. While vaccine experts know that multiple
oversight committees and multiple monitoring systems to evaluate vaccine
safety exist, the public does not—and should.183 Even in pre-pandemic times,
not enough is made public about the extensive institutional arrangements
surrounding vaccines. It is not because the information does not exist; rather,
it is likely that technical bureaucratic details do not make for a good story, even
if they are very, very important.184 In regard to COVID-19 vaccines, too,
more information about the process would be useful. For instance, while Dr.
Paul Offit mentioned publicly the existence of an NIH committee and the
mobilization to prepare for large trials,185 the Administration has not
publicized it, and it should. Being upfront about the steps taken to assure the
safety of a new vaccine would help build public confidence. For example, a
news release—and communication to major media companies—along the
lines of “NIH Set up Oversight Committees for Vaccine Development.” Similarly, “The

Vaccine Trial Data, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/15/moderna-stock-surges-afterreleasing-promising-coronavirus-vaccine-trial-data.html (July 15, 2020, 11:06 AM)
180. See Sarah Newey & Paul Nuki, Doubts Over Oxford Vaccine as it Fails to Stop Coronavirus in
Animal Trials, TELEGRAPH (May 18, 2020, 12:43 PM) https://www.telegraph.co.uk/globalhealth/science-and-disease/doubts-oxford-vaccine-fails-stop-coronavirus-animal-trials/.
181. Rachel Schraer, Coronavirus Vaccine: Macaque Monkey Trial Offers Hope, BBC NEWS
(May 15, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/health-52674739; see also Andy Gregory,
Coronavirus: Scientists Warn Oxford Vaccine May Only Offer ‘Partial Protection’ After Results of Monkey
Trial, INDEPENDENT (May 19, 2020), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/health/corona
virus-vaccine-oxford-trials-concerns-transmission-astrazeneca-latest-a9521241.html. See generally
Callaway, supra note 40.
182. Gardner, supra note 177.
183. MONICA SCHOCH-SPANA ET AL., THE PUBLIC’S ROLE IN COVID-19 VACCINATION:
PLANNING RECOMMENDATIONS INFORMED BY DESIGN THINKING AND THE SOCIAL,
BEHAVIORAL, AND COMMUNICATION SCIENCES 7, 9 (John Hopkins Univ. 2020), https://www.c
enterforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/pubs_archive/pubs-pdfs/2020/200709-The-Publics-Rol
e-in-COVID-19-Vaccination.pdf.
184. Id. at 9, 24–25.
185. See generally Emanuel & Offit, supra note 4 (discussing NIH plans to mobilize Phase 3
testing for some of the 10 vaccines).
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Advisory Committee for Immunization Practices Created a Work Group and is Actively Seeing
Vaccine Development Can Help Improve Confidence.” Even better, openly providing
regular updates from Operation Warp Speed to these committees—and
posting summaries or fact sheets online about where things are in regular
intervals—can improve transparency. Operation Warp Speed put up one fact
sheet, which seems updated through November 30, 2020.186 Monthly updates
detailing the progress on government-supported companies would help.
Companies involved in vaccine development must be transparent about
problems that arise and steps taken to address them. For example, in the
high-dose group of Moderna’s trial, about 25% of recipients had a fever
and flu-like symptoms.187 Moderna decided not to use that high dose. 188
However, that information was not included in the company’s press release,
and was later published by journalists.189 This scenario allows for the
appearance that problems were swept under the rug—which is not what
happened—and creates unnecessary mistrust. It is preferable to openly
describe any issues. The company—or government oversight officials—
can explain why results from a high-dose group would not, necessarily, be
a deal breaker; a few days of flu-like symptoms might still leave a vaccine
with a favorable risk/benefit balance. In this case, the company has also
already decided not to use the dose that created this risk out of an
abundance of caution. When AstraZeneca’s vaccine trial had an adverse
event, data about it was only made publicly available via a leak to a
journalist—again, raising questions about transparency.190
Open,
transparent communication builds trust and avoids a nonissue turning into
something those seeking to create mistrust can build on. 191 There are limits:
medical privacy may prevent giving full information, but companies need
186. See Fact Sheet: Explaining Operation Warp Speed, supra note 1.
187. Matthew Herper, He Experienced a Severe Reaction to Moderna’s Covid-19 Vaccine
Candidate. He’s Still a Believer, STAT NEWS (May 26, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/
2020/05/26/moderna-vaccine-candidate-trial-participant-severe-reaction/.
188. See Jackson et al., supra note 179, at 11 (reporting that phase 2 and phase 3 trial will
only go as high as 100-ug, after the 250-ug dose had two adverse events).
189. See Herper, supra note 187 (discussing how only “tidbits” of information about the
new vaccine are being released).
190. Adam Feuerstein, Covid-19 Vaccine Trial Participant had Serious Neurological Symptoms, but
Could be Discharged Today, AstraZeneca CEO Says, STAT NEWS (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.statnews
.com/2020/09/09/astrazeneca-covid19-vaccine-trial-hold-patient-report/.
191. Here is an example of how an anti-vaccine group took this issue and used it to create
mistrust by misrepresenting it. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Vaccine Trial Catastrophe: Moderna Vaccine
has 20% ‘Serious’ Injury Rate in High Dose Group, CHILD.’S HEALTH DEF. (May 22, 2020),
https://childrenshealthdefense.org/news/vaccine-trial-catastrophe-moderna-vaccine-has20-serious-injury-rate-in-high-dose-group/.
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to be as transparent as possible. It is also pointless not to do that, since real
problems cannot be hidden. For example, when companies have to pause
trials, that becomes public, as happened to Johnson & Johnson in
October.192 Finally, steps must be taken to prepare to respond to antivaccine misinformation about a new vaccine. Anti-vaccine groups already
started preparing the ground to create mistrust, or build on natural mistrust
for a new vaccine or as a result of the previously mentioned issues.193 While
this is not the only type of COVID-19 misinformation being spread, it is
part of it and it needs to be countered. Addressing the issues above reduces
the fertile ground available for those seeking to create mistrust. But it is
not enough. Responses must point out misinformation quickly. For
example, anti-science groups aggressively and cleverly spread the movie,
Plandemic, on social media.194 But responses demonstrating the movie’s
many inaccuracies were quickly created and shared on social media.195
While preempting and responding to misinformation before it spreads is
preferable, at the very least, misinformation about COVID-19 vaccines
should not be left unanswered.
CONCLUSION
COVID-19 continues to turn our world upside down. While many
desperately await a vaccine, we as a nation should be cautious not to take
steps that will worsen the ongoing situation and halt improvement.
Substantive pressures to prevent harms are not the only risk. In a recent
editorial, Dr. Paul Offit and oncologist Zeke Emanuel sounded caution
against potential political intervention in COVID-19 vaccine development:

192. Maggie Fox, Johnson & Johnson Pauses Covid-19 Vaccine Trial after ‘Unexplained Illness’,
CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/12/health/johnson-coronavirus-vaccine-pause-bn/in
dex.html (Oct. 13, 2020, 12:20 PM).
193. See, e.g., Bennie Badger, FACEBOOK (May 26, 2020, 10:29 PM), https://www.facebook
.com/hu.suc/posts/10157154200392551; Hear This Well, FACEBOOK (May 23, 2020, 10:26
AM), https://www.facebook.com/HearThisWell/posts/3213865541990895; Joshua Coleman,
Coronavirus and What We Do Next!, FACEBOOK (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/117
2767973/videos/10221388003307534/.
194. Renee DiResta & Isabella García-Camargo, Virality Project (US): Marketing Meets
Misinformation, STAN. UNIV.: INTERNET OBSERVATORY (May 26, 2020), https://cyber.fsi.stanfor
d.edu/io/news/manufacturing-influence-0?fbclid=IwAR39LlFmXSHY6rQ36c804KOBkpIF
gSKAv_eKJojooAI81KvJ3GMsbQ91ExY.
195. See Liz Ditz, Judy Mikovits: Not a Reliable Source of Information on COVID19, Vaccines, or
Anything in Science, I SPEAK OF DREAMS (May 8, 2020), https://lizditz.typepad.com/i_speak_of_d
reams/2020/05/judy-mikovits-not-a-reliable-source-of-information-on-covid19-vaccines-oranything-in-science.html (containing a list of responses).
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. . . the F.D.A. could issue an Emergency Use Authorization for one or more
vaccines. . .
An emergency authorization would allow Mr. Trump to hold his news conference and
declare victory. But like President George W. Bush’s “Mission Accomplished”
proclamation, it has the potential to be a travesty. Millions of vaccines could be
distributed without proof that the vaccine can prevent disease or transmission.196
...
Thousands of Americans have already died as Donald Trump has perpetually
postponed effective public health interventions and made poor therapeutic
recommendations. We must be on alert to prevent him from corrupting the rigorous
assessment of safety and effectiveness of Covid-19 vaccines in order to pull an October
vaccine surprise to try to win re-election.197

President-Elect Joe Biden’s COVID-19 plan emphasizes the need for expertise
and states that his Administration will: “Put scientists in charge of all decisions
on safety and efficacy; publicly release clinical data for any vaccine the FDA
approves; and authorize career staff to write a written report for public review
and permit them to appear before Congress and speak publicly
uncensored.”198 Sticking to this statement can help assuage concerns, but the
timing is tricky: the new Administration will not come in until January, and
companies may well move to request an Emergency Use Authorization before
that.199 Practical and political pressures can lead to inappropriately rushed
vaccine development—and can backfire. The United States has a remarkable
system for testing vaccines and monitoring their safety, and we should let it
work in this case, too. Adjustments can be made without forgoing safety, and
we should make sure we are, indeed, not sacrificing safety or effectiveness.

196. Emanuel & Offit, supra note 4.
197. See id. (concerning politicizing the process).
198. The Biden-Harris Plan to Beat Covid-19, BIDEN-HARRIS TRANSITION https://buildbackb
etter.com/priorities/covid-19/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2020).
199. Lisa Schnirring, Feds Update Vaccine Arrival Amid Record US Covid-19 Rise, UNIV. OF
MINN. CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RSCH. & POL’Y (Nov. 13, 2020) https://www.cidrap.umn
.edu/news-perspective/2020/11/feds-update-vaccine-arrival-amid-record-us-covid-19-rise.

